Critical infrastructures are falsely believed to be safe when they are isolated from the Internet. However, the recent appearance of Stuxnet demonstrated that isolated networks are no longer safe. We observe that a better intrusion detection scheme can be established based on the unique features of critical infrastructures. In this paper, we propose a whitelist-based detection system. Network and application-level whitelists are proposed, which are combined to form a novel cross-layer whitelist. Through experiments, we confirm that the proposed whitelists can exactly detect attack packets, which cannot be achieved by existing schemes.
Introduction
Information technology (IT) has become the cornerstone of the critical national infrastructure used to provide electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, finance, etc. IT systems acquire information and control remote terminal units, which are called supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). Multiple servers with different purposes and terminal PCs can be the members of this critical system. In this paper, we refer to this system as the critical IT-based infrastructure (CIBI). Unlike general-purpose systems and networks, CIBI has some unique features as follows [1] , [2] :
• Closed: CIBI is not open to the outside world. The
Internet is not connected physically.
• Static: once the systems and network are established, their configuration seldom changes.
• Unique: each detailed implementation is distinct siteby-site, which makes it difficult to adopt off-the-shelf security systems without customization.
The level of security requirements for CIBI should be high. However, the security level is falsely believed high just because it is closed and unique. Since CIBI is closed, it is believed that attackers have great difficulty in compromising CIBI directly. And since CIBI is unique, it is believed that attackers have to have detailed domain knowledge for a successful attack. However, these blind beliefs were dashed by Stuxnet in 2010 [3] . Stuxnet shows that CIBI is not safe from cyber-terrorism despite the closed and unique properties. This new style worm includes zero-day exploits, a Windows rootkit, the first-ever programmable logic controllers (PLC) rootkit, peer-to-peer updates, and other unique features. It is urgent to organize new defense schemes. In this paper, the attack model has the same format as Stuxnet. First, an employee of CIBI carelessly brings in removable media with a worm and infects a CIBI PC. The worm propagates inside the LAN until it finds a target system. This propagation may include a network scanning phase. However, the worm may be designed to be sneaky. It may wait until it finally reaches a target system with the vulnerable software through hop-by-hop infection of removable media. The worm may also include zero-day vulnerabilities to evade detection. Once the target software with the vulnerabilities is identified, the worm tries to collect critical information or arbitrarily control the system.
We propose a new intrusion detection system (IDS) for CIBI. Unfortunately, recent IDS technologies have mainly been developed toward general-purpose IT systems. They identify well-known attack patterns on the Internet and raise alarms. However, as shown with Stuxnet, CIBI attacks are more sophisticated and evasive. On one hand, many techniques of anomaly detection have been proposed for computer and network security [4] , [5] . Anomaly detection is attractive since it can detect unknown attacks. However, it suffers from false positives, normal activities falsely taken as attacks, and this weakness makes them difficult to deploy as real systems. According to the exhaustive surveys on anomaly detection [4] , a large number of anomaly detection systems have been proposed. However, few of them are practically used. We need to develop intrusion detection systems specialized for CIBI.
We observe that the properties of CIBI give us a new direction for designing a better intrusion detection system. We focus on extracting the usual formats of networking messages, called a whitelist, at the network layer, application layer, and with a combination of them. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• A network-level whitelist is proposed. We observe that normal networking patterns rarely change in CIBI. We make a whitelist of normal networking patterns and detect unusual patterns as an attack.
• We propose an application-level whitelist. We assume that the application-level messages are static in CIBI 
Whitelist-Based Intrusion Detection
Before we explain whitelists in detail, we first define attack models. In this paper, an attack is based on a worm-virus. As CIBI cannot be directly reachable by outside attackers, a worm-virus would be the only vector for them. We define three models: active attacks, passive attacks, and sneaky attacks. 1) Active attack: Once CIBI systems are infected, the worm actively scans the network. Most of the current worms, including Stuxnet, have this reconnaissance phase. The goal of network scanning is to find more victims to infect. However, the unusual pattern of a network scan would give a security administrator a hint at identifying attacks. We propose a network-level whitelist to detect an active attack.
2) Passive attack: The worm does not perform any network scanning specifically to evade network-level detection. We assume that the worm-maker did not know the details of the application protocol. However, the worm can still try to issue hazardous commands to damage CIBI systems. For example, it may give an arbitrary command to shut down some critical components that should not be given. We propose an application-level whitelist to detect such threats.
3) Sneaky attack: The attacker lays extremely low and has some knowledge about the application protocol. The worm never performs a network scan or gives any unusual commands which would be detected by our proposed network-level or application-level whitelists. Instead, the worm only tries to change some parts of the command. For example, the worm may issue a command that reduces a gas pressure to an extraordinarily low level. This kind of attack is difficult to detect as the packet seems normal at both the network and application-levels. Only a parameter value is out of normal range. We propose a cross-layer whitelist to detect such sneaky attacks.
Recent studies propose new intrusion detection models for SCADA networks [1] , [2] . However, they are mainly based on the stable occurrences of network-level flows [2] and application-level commands [1] , which therefore can cover only some portions of active or passive attacks. On the other hand, our proposed scheme can cover all types of active, passive, and sneaky attacks.
Network-Level Whitelist
A network-level whitelist is built from packet headers. We assume that CIBI uses a TCP/IP network and the communication is based on a client/server model. We define a flow id to be a 4-tuple of client IP address, server IP address, server port number, and direction flag. The direction flag is a boolean variable. If the value is true, the packet was captured during the transmission from the client to the server. Otherwise, it was from the server to the client. When a packet is delivered from a client to a server with a client IP address of 192.168.0.1, a server address of 172.16.10.20, and a server port number of 3272, the flow id is denoted as (192.168.0.1, 172.16.10.20, 3272, T).
A whitelist is a set of flow ids constructed during a learning phase. We denote this network-level whitelist as an N-list. We use a threshold parameter, θ n ; if a flow id occurred more than or equal to θ n times during the learning phase, the flow id is inserted into the whitelist. The ith flow id in an N-list is denoted as f i . We assume that there are r distinct flow ids, and the N-list={
Once an N-list is established, every packet header is checked against the list. If it does not belong to the list, the packet triggers an intrusion detection alarm. Note that we can detect active attacks as most scanning packets did not appear during the learning phase.
Application-Level Whitelist
A passive attack cannot be detected by an N-list. We propose an application-level whitelist, denoted A-list, to detect passive attacks.
Although the packets of a passive attack belong to the N-list, the payload is quite different from usual packets. The attackers arbitrarily issue the payload because they do not know the details of the application protocol. As CIBI is static, some patterns will repeat in the payload of normal packets. We excerpt these patterns and insert them into the A-list. Once the A-list is constructed, the payload of each packet is checked against the list. If the packet does not match any item of the list, an intrusion detection alarm is triggered.
The A-list is a set of meta-messages. For simplicity, a message is the payload part of a packet in this paper. Basically, each message can be unique. A meta-message represents multiple different messages of the same format. The challenging problem here is how to define the same format for different messages. We tackle this problem by proposing a token-based meta-message. In our proposed scheme, two messages are the same if their meta-messages equal. The A-list contains the meta-messages rather than the original messages.
We assume that a message consists of multiple tokens and each token is separated by known delimiters, or the length of the tokens is already known. Then a message can be parsed into token-level.
We use M to denote the collection of all the messages during the learning phase. The ith message is denoted as m i . We assume that the total number of messages is n. Therefore, M = [m 1 , m 2 , ..., m 
From T , we extract frequently-occurring tokens. As a CIBI is static, these tokens form the basis of a metamessage. We define f i j to be the total number of t i j in M. We define valid token set, V, as follows:
where θ a is a pre-defined threshold value for A-list. Using V, we can transform m i into a meta-message, denoted as m i = [t Once the A-list is constructed, every packet is checked against the list. First, m i is excerpted from a packet, and this is transformed into a meta-message m i . Then, we check if m i belongs to the A-list. If not, an alarm is triggered at the application-level as an intrusion detection.
Cross-Layer Whitelist
If attackers have more knowledge on the CIBI protocol, they would try to evade the A-list by designing the worm not to issue an arbitrary attack command. Instead, they may issue some critical commands which are of valid formats of the A-list. We call this a sneaky attack, and this kind of attack is difficult to defeat as the message format seems normal.
We observe that combining the N-list and A-list makes a new whitelist that is useful to detect sneaky attacks. In this paper, this combined whitelist is called the C-list. The motivation for the C-list is that certain critical messages are issued by only a small number of terminals. For example, although there can be multiple terminal PCs in a CIBI LAN, only a few terminals are assigned to an administrator who has the privilege to issue such critical commands as DELETE, SHUT-DOWN, etc. If this command is issued unusually from the other terminal PCs, this would be considered abnormal and an alarm would be triggered.
We assume that the N-list and A-list are already established. The C-list is built on them as a matrix. Figure 1 shows this matrix where the rows are the N-list and columns are the A-list. We use c [i] [ j] to denote the element in the matrix with ith row and jth column. All the elements in the matrix are initialized to zero. Those elements are set to one only if they occur in the same packet. In other words, c [i] [ j] is set to one only if f i and m j have been seen in the same packet and the number of such packets are equal to or more than θ c , a pre-defined threshold value.
Once the C-list is established, we check every packet to see if it belongs to the C-list. For a given packet, we derive its flow id and meta-message, denoted as f i and m j , 
Experiments
We evaluate the proposed schemes through experiments. We implement N-list, A-list, and C-list. As C-list is the most advanced scheme, its experimental results will be shown. Every experiment consists of two phases: a learning phase and an execution phase. During the learning phase, C-list is established. Then, we insert attack packets into the original traffic trace. During the execution phase, C-list triggers an alarm when any packet not belonging to the list is found. The experiments show that the C-list successfully detects attack packets.
As sophisticated attacks may generate seemingly normal CIBI traffic, it is quite difficult for current intrusion detection systems to exactly identify attack packets. For comparative purposes, we implement the random-forests algorithm as it is one of the best network-level anomaly detection schemes [6] , [7] . We show that this general algorithm does not work well for CIBI systems.
We configured a test-bed like a typical CIBI network that uses a communication protocol similar to the distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) [8] , which is a standard protocol for SCADA. This configuration is based on the authors' experience of managing a real CIBI network for several years.
The test-bed includes three operator PCs, one print server, and four main servers. The main servers are a communication server, a database server, an application server, and a front end processor (FEP). The FEP supervises three remote terminal units (RTU) and one programmable logic controller (PLC). Each RTU controls a sensor. Six server programs are running on the main servers and the printer server.
While following the basic assumption of related work that CIBI traffic is stable and well-behaved [1] , [2] , we also check these properties against a real CIBI traffic trace from a financial institution. This traffic was collected for three consecutive business days from 2 April 2008. The real network components were configured in a similar way to our test-bed. The traffic includes 64,328 packets and 4,703 TCP sessions. The network protocol was privately designed on top of TCP/IP that includes 16 different commands such as SET, GET, PROBE, REPORT, RESET, etc, but eight commands are more frequently used than the others. The maximum number of distinct destination IP addresses contacted by a source is 24. We confirm that the real traffic is stable and well-behaved like our test-bed traffic. Although the statistics processing on the real traffic trace was restrictively available to us, only in front of the security manager, the policy of the institution did not allow us to perform experiments directly on the collected traffic.
We define valid message formats for the test-bed CIBI. We generate normal packets, based on the message formats following DNP3. Four traffic traces are produced for the experiments, traces of 4,000, 6,000, 8,000 and 10,000 normal packets, respectively. They are called the original traffic traces, and used for the learning-phase. We denote the traffic traces as T4, T6, T8, and T10, respectively.
For the normal packets generated, the numbers of TCP sessions for T4, T6, T8, and T10 are 333, 500, 667, and 833, respectively. Each TCP session includes 1∼3 commands such as SET, GET, PROBE, SHUT-DOWN. We define 16 valid commands for the test-bed. We divide the commands into four groups according to their frequency; group A, B, C, and D include 4 commands each, but the commands of group A occur around two-times as many as group B, and group B occurs two-times as many as group C, and so on. We find such a bias in the real traffic trace explained above. The T4, T6, T8, and T19 include 666, 1,000, 1,334, and 1,666 commands each. Therefore, the average number of packets per command becomes around 6.
After the C-list is established from the learning phase, we deliberately insert attack packets into the original traffic trace, which is called a modified traffic trace. The modified traffic trace includes three different types of attack packets. The first type reflects an active attack; the PC of operator1 is infected by the worm, and the PC generates network scanning packets. The number of active attack packets is 100. The attack packets set the destination IP addresses to the randomly chosen IP addresses from the C class network to which the attack PC belongs. We observe that the maximum number of distinct destination IP addresses contacted by a single source in the real traffic set is 24. We set this maximum number below 36 in the test-bed traffic. Therefore, the number of 100 destinations is abnormally large, compared with normal traffic. As these attack packets are generated at network layer, they do not include any meaningful payload as well as commands.
The second attack type reflects a passive attack; the PC of operator3 is infected. The worm generates attack packets that seem normal at the network layer. However, it contains unusual application-level commands. The number of passive attack packets is 100: 30 packets including totally garbage contents, 40 packets including invalid command, and 40 packets with valid commands but invalid parameter values. The last 40 packets include such valid commands as GET, SET, PROBE, REPORT. Each command generates 10 attack packets.
The modified traffic trace also includes packets of a sneaky attack; the PC of operator1 is infected. We assume that operator3 is the only administrator who can issue critical commands such as SHUT-DOWN. However, the in- Table 1 Experimental results of C-list (θ n = θ a = θ c = 2).
T4
T6 T8 T10 false positive ratio 0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% true positive ratio 100% 100% 100% 100% fected PC generates attack packets including this command, and each command generates 10 attack packets. The total number of sneaky attack packets is 50. Table 1 shows the results of the experiments; an alert is triggered by the C-list whenever a packet does not belong to the list. The C-list does not generate false negatives; all attack packets are detected. A small number of false-positive errors occur (normal packets mistaken as attack packets). We show the ratios in the table. Note that the ratio of true positive is perfect, and the ratio of false positive is very small. Table 2 shows the ratios of the false-positives and true-positives, obtained by running the random-forests algorithm. This is the best results of the algorithm, but both ratios are much worse than those of C-list. We repeat the whole experiments 100 times independently, and the table shows the averages.
